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‘It’s all leverage, essentially false money from false
housing prices and false mortgages that may never be
paid’ e Mike Gelband, Former Global Head, Lehman
Brothers (pp 134e135).
A Colossal Failure of Common Sense e The Incredible
Inside Story of the Collapse of Lehman Brothers by Larry
McDonald with Patrick Robinson is an insider’s first hand
report on the failure of one of the largest investment banks
in the world, leading to an economic catastrophe of the
magnitude the world was yet to witness. However, this is
neither a fact sheet nor a research document. It is not an
impartial account either e the author Lawrence McDonald
was a former vice president of Lehman Brothers and among
his biases is an avid dislike of bureaucracy and conventional
corporate management operational policies. Once we
factor in the possible results of these biases, the book
provides important cues to understanding one of the most
mystifying business failure stories of recent times. The
book is, above all, an enjoyable read.
Before getting into the Lehman story, McDonald
prepares the readers by introducing ‘The Man in the Ivory
Tower’, Richard Fuld, then CEO of Lehman Brothers, whom
Conde Nast Portfolio once named one of the worst Amer-
ican CEOs of all times,1 a man whose insatiable self-interest
pushed the investors’ interest to a corner.2
The authors show that there were enough warning bells
given by the analyst team to the top management about the
impending mortgage bust and housing bubble. The entire
mortgage industry bet on the fact that prices would keep1 http://www.cnbc.com/id/30502091/Portfolio_s_Worst_
American_CEOs_of_All_Time?slideZ21.
2 The GlucksmaneFuld episode shows Fuld’s bull-headed atti-
tude which along with that of his mentor-predecessor Lew
Glucksman, led to a disaster. The ConAgra bid could be taken as
a precursor to Fuld’s successive backing of bad deals, deals that
were overambitious and seemed oblivious of the business funda-
mentals pp 96e97.
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lative bubble. Loans were given to borrowers with little or
no creditworthiness against mortgages tagged to housing
assets. In case of a housing market crash the entire risk
would be transferred to the investment banks holding the
Collateralised Debt Obligation (CDO)s for which the
underlying assets were these mortgages. All investment
banks like Lehman were thus looking at huge losses if the
mortgage backed securities which were packed inside their
CDOs defaulted.
The chapter on the General Electric (GE) bankruptcy
case also gives some insight into the corporate activities of
Lehman. The author throws some light on the dubious
practices of investment banks with regard to the issue of
qualified special purpose entities (QSPE) and rule 140 of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), an
accounting rule that helped the banks window dress their
risky assets. The GE case also highlights the indiscriminate
use of Credit Default Swaps by investment bankers. ABX,
the asset backed securities index, a reliable indicator of
the mortgage market, which normally never went down
started slipping, albeit slowly. As the mortgage market
failed the tremor was felt everywhere. As it turned out,
Lehman was most affected in this direction, being exposed
heavily to the real estate market through CDOs and direct
investments. This chapter could serve as a case study on
the failure of leadership and strategic management
decisions.
Towards the end this book the authors bring out the
events that led to the mortgage crash. It all begun when
Countrywide Financial, the number one mortgage lender in
the US, could not arrange to refinance its loans. When the
bank said no to Countrywide on the basis of delinquency of
the assets, the panic button was hit. The shadow banking
system cast the largest ever shadow on the modern finan-
cial system. Lehman management, apparently unruffled by
the failure of the mortgage market, continued with their
misadventures with the mortgage industry up to the point
when Bear Stearns, one of the most admired securities
firms in the USA, failed. The Federal Reserve System, the
central banking system of the USA, had to intervene and
engineer a takeover of the firm by JP Morgan Chase. The
book also contains an important commentary on the road to
Lehman’s bankruptcy. In the epilogue McDonald suggests
that the decision to let Lehman sink without a Fed engi-
neered bail-out rested more on the personal wrath of Henry
Paulson, the Secretary of the US Treasury than on economic
jurisprudence.
Book Review 181One of the main attractions of the book is the insight into
the various aspects of field level activities of investment
banking. For business school students who are aspirants of an
‘I-Bank’ job, this provides useful tips. Some practical aspects
of trading and analysis, such as the importance of fundamental
analysis of credit instruments, are highlighted with examples.
One of the chapters deals with the failure of Delta
Airways, a classic case of bankruptcy. There is an inter-
esting live commentary on the author’s own trading of
Delta bonds that gives an insight into the actual trading
scenario on the floor.3 Elsewhere, the author introduces the
concept of Collateralised Debt Obligations in layman terms.
He provides us with illustrations that prove that financial
business should not be sales driven at all. The author rightly
points to our inability to assess impending danger through
his narration of the now famous Fannie Mae story.
Another valuable contribution by Larry McDonald to the
understanding of the entire domino effect of the global
crisis of 2008 is his presentation of the field level picture of
the mortgage business. In the opinion of this reviewer, this
book is a must read for anyone interested in the crisis, if
only for this reason.3 pp 146e148.The Lehman story contains all the classic ingredients
of business failure e improper product design (product
engineers far removed from reality), loopholes in
regulatory/statutory bodies, communication failure,
business intelligence failure (at least failure to give
proper emphasis on the same), dubious corporate
governance practices highlighting the agency problem
and above all, strategic and leadership failure.
Management teachers can use this as a resource for an
integrated case study.
Finally, the story of the Lehman failure also points to the
moral role that business education must play in the global
economy. The world must realise that ethical failures of
individuals ultimately lead to economic failure of the
system.
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